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Provisional summary record of the 3rd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 17 February 2011, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Kapambwe ..... (Zambia)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda and other organizational matters (*continued*) (E/2011/8 and E/2011/69; E/2011/L.2)

Draft decision E/2011/L.2: Appointment of additional members of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti

1. **Mr. McNee** (Chair of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti), introducing draft decision E/2011/L.2 on behalf of the Group, said that the draft decision named two new members to the Group, the Bahamas and the United States of America. He was certain that their experience and support would enrich the Group's efforts to support Haiti.

2. **Ms. Bethel** (Bahamas) said that as a close neighbour to Haiti and fellow member of the Caribbean Community, the Bahamas had a special interest in the sustainable development of Haiti. Her Government had sought to join the Group owing to its belief that Haiti's recovery required the dedicated engagement and long-term commitment of the international community.

3. **Mr. Barton** (United States of America) said that his delegation was looking forward to participating in the recovery efforts for Haiti and was confident in the Chair's leadership of the Group.

4. **The President** said that he took it that the Council wished to adopt draft decision E/2011/L.2.

5. *The draft decision contained in document E/2011/L.2 was adopted.*

Basic programme of work of the Council (*continued*) (E/2011/1)

6. **The President** invited the Chair of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti to give his oral report in accordance with Council resolution 2010/28.

7. **Mr. McNee** (Chair of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti), speaking on behalf of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti, said that since the Group had last reported to the Council in July 2010, Hurricane Tomas had struck, revealing Haiti's vulnerability to the effects of natural disasters and compounding the hardships of its people, who had also been forced to contend with the outbreak and rapid spread of cholera. While the initial mortality rate from the disease had declined as prevention efforts had taken hold, the health system still required measures to prevent reoccurrences. The political uncertainty following the first round of presidential elections in November 2010 had further exacerbated matters. In view of the many challenges ahead, the expanded mandate of the Group was increasingly relevant.

8. In that regard, the Group had met with representatives of the Office of the United Nations Special Envoy for Haiti to obtain information on reconstruction efforts and to learn about the work of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission. The Commission had approved an additional $430 million in projects and had developed a strategic plan with clear goals set for October 2011, particularly in the areas of education and job creation for those displaced in camps. The Group had been informed of the acute need for land allocations and the provision of services in alternative locations in order to reduce the number of displaced persons. It had also been encouraged to advocate for the international community's continued engagement with Haiti, in view of the political upheavals faced by the country.

9. The Group had also held a videoconference with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti to assess the humanitarian and development situation in the country. While the Deputy Special Representative had described the overall humanitarian response as a success, he had also noted that work remained to be done in terms of responding to the earthquake and cholera outbreak and improving disaster preparedness and risk reduction strategies. He had countered criticisms of slow funding, noting that the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission had approved $3 billion in projects for implementation. However, he had recognized that the funding of priorities was imbalanced, with areas such as energy, government infrastructure and debris removal facing shortfalls. The United Nations integrated strategic framework had been finalized, which consolidated the Organization's presence in the country under a common framework based on the Government of Haiti's national plan and the strategic framework of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.

10. The recent announcement by the provisional electoral council of a run-off presidential election was a positive step forward in establishing a credible Government. The Group encouraged all parties to ensure the future integrity of the electoral process and to work together to foster long-term development.

11. Once the new Administration was in place, the Group would visit Haiti to meet with Government officials and key stakeholders, including representatives of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and United Nations bodies involved in Haiti. The Group would continue to advocate a leading role for the Government in all aspects of the recovery and to provide advice on Haiti's long-term development strategy, particularly regarding the coherence of United Nations activities. At the same time, local actors in both rural and urban areas must be empowered to participate in the reconstruction of the country as a means to ensure its sustainability; political stability could be achieved only by Haitians themselves. The Group encouraged all efforts to ensure the democratic election of an efficient and responsible Government.

12. **The President** invited the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident Coordinator in Haiti to give a statement.

13. **Mr. Fisher** (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti) said that campaigning for the run-off presidential elections on 20 March 2011 had begun that day in Haiti, with the results expected by 16 April. The newly elected President and Administration should be in place by early May. The only change foreseen to the electoral commission was the nomination of a ninth member by the Roman Catholic Church.

14. Since voting centres had been found to be the primary source of fraud during the first round of elections, measures were being implemented which took into account recommendations by the Organization of American States (OAS). Some 1,500 centres were being categorized for security risks, police were being trained for the elections and the same number of security agents would be employed as in the first round. Electoral violations would be monitored by the National Election Observation Council and OAS, which would increase its monitors from 120 in the first round to 200 in the second. In addition, ballots would be colour-coded to prevent fraud; boy scouts would be posted at all voting centres to assist voters, particularly the illiterate; and call centres would be set up to ensure that everyone had the opportunity to cast a valid vote. Votes would be tallied at voting centres on results sheets and the overall tabulation and checking of votes would take place in Port-au-Prince. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) would provide logistical support to that end. Furthermore, a code of conduct was being developed by representatives of both candidates, in coordination with MINUSTAH and the National Democratic Institute, to prevent violence during the elections.

15. There was a $2.5 million funding shortfall for election-related needs, which was expected to be covered by donor pledges. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was prepared to pre-finance the shortfall, if donor pledges arrived late.

16. The Board of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission had met with the presidential candidates, Ms. Mirlande Manigat and Mr. Michel Martelly, to urge them to maintain the hard-won strategic directions adopted by the Commission in order to support continuity in the country. Ms. Manigat had emphasized to the Board the need for Haitian leadership in the recovery process, while Mr. Martelly had stressed his focus on the rule of law, investment in Haitian institutions and the coordination of stakeholders involved in the recovery effort.

17. With regard to the humanitarian situation, the immediate response to the earthquake had successfully protected and provided for the basic needs of those displaced. In 2010, the target of 30,000 transitional shelters had been exceeded, hundreds of thousands of houses had been assessed and building standards had been revised. Much progress had been made in the removal of rubble from the epicentre of the earthquake and most children in affected areas had returned to school. However, in the wake of Hurricane Tomas and the cholera epidemic, three outstanding challenges remained: to continue the post-earthquake resettlement and recovery process; to develop long-term responses to the cholera epidemic after the initial containment; and to improve preparedness and long-term risk reduction strategies for the cyclone season.

18. As a new risk reduction measure, seismologists had created a map of seismic activity in Haiti. Having analysed the massive earthquake of 12 January 2010, they had discovered that it had occurred along a secondary fault and that pressure on the major fault in the south of the country had therefore not been relieved. Another earthquake in the south was thus likely and the fault in the north of the country presented a similar threat. As a disaster preparedness

measure, an assessment of the structural soundness of buildings in Cap-Haïtien, a city in the north that sat astride that fault, was expected in 2011.

19. The population of the camps had nearly halved since mid-2010 and residents were being encouraged to return to their communities. To that end, basic services, such as water, health care and education, would be transferred to nearby communities. However, economic recovery and job creation would first be needed to enable people to leave the camps.

20. A growing number of organizations participating in the relief effort had indicated their intention to stop providing support services in the camps and to focus on recovery. While the camps needed to be downsized, in the interim period some of their needs would remain unmet. Other areas of concern included the threat of forced eviction facing a quarter of camp residents and the need to protect women and girls from gender-based violence.

21. The ability of the Haitian Government to coordinate the humanitarian response had improved significantly and it had played a strong leadership role not only by responding swiftly to the cholera epidemic but also by identifying the outbreak as major. Epidemiologists now expected to see a considerable reduction in infection rates. Moreover, the fatality rate, which was still hovering around 2 per cent, was gradually falling to 1 per cent — the norm for cholera epidemics. Consequently, Médecins sans frontières and other major actors had announced their intention to pull out or to reduce their involvement, expecting Government facilities to take over.

22. The Government was playing a strong role in coordinating disaster preparedness through a coordination committee on disaster risk reduction, co-chaired by the Haitian Prime Minister and the Speaker, and through strengthening the central and local capacities of the Department for Civil Protection. The disaster preparedness plan for the 2011 hurricane season was based on the strategy developed the previous year.

23. With respect to long-term development, the major strategic priorities of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission were urban renewal and housing, private sector development and the creation of a new development pole outside of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Such a pole in the north-east of the country had already attracted sufficient investment to create 20,000 industrial jobs and further investment could triple that number. Other strategic priorities included improving agricultural and rural development, education, health care, water and sanitation systems. There was an observed disparity in the allocation of resources to projects approved by the Commission. In particular, projects related to energy, debris removal and infrastructure development had received very little investment. The Commission would therefore look at ways to achieve more equitable investment across all priority sectors.

24. Other challenges facing Haiti included the weak rule of law and the complex land tenure system, which were disincentives for external investors. National revenues needed to increase so that civil servants' salaries and other basic expenses could be paid from national revenues rather than using international assistance funds. While revenue from customs and taxation had exceeded expectations in 2010, it remained far below the required levels.

25. The mandate of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was scheduled to expire in October 2011 and Haitian officials had indicated their preference for the Commission to become a Government institution. While Haiti needed to be in charge of its own future, mutual accountability with international partners must be ensured and technical ministries strengthened. Consequently, technical round tables would be instituted for each of the Commission's major priorities, to be headed by senior Government officials from corresponding ministries with support from the international community.

26. With regard to the coherence of United Nations activities, an integrated strategic framework had been developed to organize the work of MINUSTAH and other United Nations agencies around the four major strategic pillars of Haiti's national plan: territorial, institutional, social and economic development. That framework had been approved by the integrated mission task force for Haiti based in New York and by the Haitian Government. In aligning its approach with the priorities of the Haitian Government, the United Nations had reduced its transaction costs, improved accountability and strengthened the level of confidence between the United Nations and the Haitian Government.

27. The United Nations country team in Haiti had identified three areas in which United Nations agencies

could collectively add value: building institutional capacity at the central government level; decentralizing United Nations activities to strengthen local government; and promoting the role of women in economic recovery and decision-making. A subsequent MINUSTAH retreat had focused on the issues of the rule of law and capacity-building.

28. While Haiti faced a time of uncertainty, he was cautiously optimistic that it would be able to complete the process of political transition, actively implement the approved programmes and projects and resolve outstanding problems through adequate resource allocation. It was therefore extremely important for international partners to fulfil their commitments.

29. **The President** acknowledged the commitment made by UNDP to pre-finance the funding shortfall and urged the donor community to respond quickly by providing the necessary funding.

30. **Mr. Cazeau** (Observer for Haiti) welcomed the contributions being made by all organizations towards the successful recovery of Haiti. A great deal could be accomplished over the coming years to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. While Haiti would not attain the Goals by 2015, the time had come to implement existing plans.

31. **Mr. Oussein** (Comoros) said that, while significant resources had been spent in Haiti, media reports gave the impression that nothing was being achieved. The United Nations needed to look at ways to give its accomplishments in Haiti greater visibility.

32. **Mr. Barton** (United States of America) asked whether there were any particular concerns related to the political campaigns that needed to be addressed. He also wished to know more about any changes that might be made to the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission in the future. Finally, he asked what measures could be taken in response to the perilous seismic situation described.

33. **Mr. Andrade** (Observer for Brazil) asked whether the Commission or the technical round tables would coordinate the humanitarian clusters and recovery efforts, and to what degree the cluster lead agencies were involved in the transition and recovery processes.

34. **Mr. Fisher** (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti) said that while the predominant press narrative had focused on a lack of progress, recent media coverage showed an increasing preparedness to understand the reasons for the slow pace of recovery. Above all, the underlying structural problems that had existed before the earthquake could not be resolved by the humanitarian response. The United Nations and its partners had not been clear regarding what had been achieved and what resources were available. Nevertheless, progress in Haiti compared favourably with other humanitarian situations on that scale.

35. Among key concerns, in addition to the shortfall in funding, was the need to understand the strategies of the presidential candidates. The newly adopted code of conduct should result in a more orderly process leading up to the voting. However, it was also critical to ensure the security of the voting centres and to monitor potential violations on voting day.

36. While the future of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was unclear, its international members wished to remain engaged to ensure mutual accountability, which was one of the Commission's major objectives. Meanwhile, its Haitian members were dissatisfied and often viewed their role as rubber stamping rather than substantive. It was therefore important for the technical round tables to be strengthened and for the technical ministries, rather than the international organizations, to become capable of submitting proposals to the Commission and its successors. He noted that the overwhelming desire, expressed by both candidates, was for Haiti to play a predominant role in its own future.

37. Much work had already been done in the earthquake area to improve building codes and standards. The greater challenge was to provide alternative development and employment opportunities and relieve population congestion in Port-au-Prince. A combination of improved urban planning and devolution to other population centres was needed and the Department for Civil Protection needed to factor disaster risk reduction into its work.

38. Regarding the coordination of the humanitarian response and transition efforts, there was too much overlap of the coordination mechanisms. In that regard, the Prime Minister of Haiti had expressed the desire for more of the humanitarian clusters and technical round tables to be merged in 2011. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the

humanitarian clusters thus needed to determine how to adapt to the changing situation. Both the Haitian Government and the humanitarian agencies were involved in systematizing the coordination framework.

39. The President said that the success stories of MINUSTAH needed to be given greater visibility. Accordingly, Mr. Fisher and the Chair of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti should continue to engage the media on developments in Haiti.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.